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ABSTRACT 
In 1999, the Government of China enforced a cross-provincial, quota-based Water Allocation Agreement 
that was developed in 1987 and titled Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) to ensure that flow to the 
Yellow River mouth would not be cut off. This policy was in line with the refocus of the Government, 
over the last decade, on sustainable water use and keeping the Yellow River healthy. The policy 
enforcement ended more than two decades of flow-cutoffs, that is, periods when the Yellow River did not 
reach the Bohai Sea at its mouth, during an increasing number of days every year. While the UWFR was 
an important step forward in protecting the water resources in Northern China, the allocation did not take 
into account the value of water in various uses and water users who had to give up water resources, 
chiefly irrigators in the upstream and midstream provinces were not compensated. Could alternative water 
management options have brought about a better outcome for irrigators and the downstream ecosystem? 
We analyze this question using a Multi-Agent System (MAS) modeling framework for the Yellow River 
Basin (YRB). We find that compared to the baseline scenario simulating UWFR management, water 
trading among irrigation districts would result in a small decline in water consumption, a significant 
increase in agricultural GDP, and a small increase in total basin GDP. Overall GDP increase would be 
much higher if domestic and industrial uses became active water trading sectors. 
Keywords:  water allocation, river basin management, multi-agent system, optimization, Yellow 
River    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The management of the Yellow River Basin (YRB) is critical for China’s agricultural production and 
socioeconomic development. The cultivated area in the basin is about 13 percent of total cultivated area in 
China, but the basin holds only 3 percent of the country’s water resources. At the same time, the basin 
provides domestic supplies to an estimated 150 million people, both inside and outside the basin area, as 
well as to rapidly growing industries, both in the downstream area and, more recently, in the midstream 
area, where mining and chemical industries are rapidly expanding. As a result, the basin faces severe 
water shortages. Given the extreme water shortages in the basin, how can water resources be managed to 
continue to support agricultural and economic development while also improving outcomes for the 
environment? 
In the past, increasing the supply of water through new water development has been a common 
strategy to manage water resources. However, in maturing water economies, such as the YRB, the focus 
is increasingly shifting to demand management to generate both physical savings of water and economic 
savings by increasing the output per unit of evaporative loss of water, by reducing water pollution, and by 
reducing non-beneficial water uses (Randall 1981). Many studies have focused on various aspects of 
demand management to reduce water shortages in the basin, such as water rights (Wang et al. 2008, Shao 
et al. 2009, Zhao et al. 2009) and water prices (Huang et al. 2006, Wang et al. 2008). Since 2000, the 
Government of China has promoted the establishment of water rights systems by conducting 
demonstration projects in the YRB aimed at reducing water competition among sectors. The purpose of 
these demonstration sites is to reallocate water from agriculture to industry by increasing irrigation 
efficiency, generally through engineering measures, such as canal lining. One transfer pilot project 
operates in Ningxia Province, and 16 projects signed transfer contracts in Inner Mongolia, with a value of 
US$100 million. Under these projects, irrigation districts transfer part of their water-use rights to 
industrial enterprises for a period of 25 years. However, analyses showed that water users in the irrigation 
districts are generally not aware of the water rights transfer; transfers are determined by the 
administration, not markets; and there are no adjustments based on market signals or economic measures. 
Thus, major challenges remain until a true market for water rights can be established (Ringler et al. 2010). 
The intra-provincial irrigation-to-agriculture transfers in the YRB provide important insights for 
the potential development of inter-provincial water trading, which has been discussed by both 
policymakers and water allocation managers at the Ministry of Water Resources and the Yellow River 
Conservancy Commission (YRCC) for several years. Such a reallocation could potentially increase the 
water allocation efficiency of the 1987 cross-provincial water allocation agreement. However, relatively 
water-abundant upstream provinces have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo in water 
allocation. Moreover, given the large share of return flows in the YRB, changes in provincial permits 
from upstream to downstream might be inconsequential. It is therefore important to assess the full costs 
and benefits of changing the current system of water quotas. Heaney et al. (2005) assess the benefits of 
water reallocation across YRB water resource regions using a production function approach without 
accounting for the river hydrology (flow routing or return flows). They estimate economic benefits 
through increased value of agricultural production at 1 billion RMB per year, with reallocation chiefly 
occurring from the midstream to the downstream area.  
The purpose of this paper is to study water rights trading across all sectors and within an 
integrated economic-hydrologic modeling framework using a multi-agent system developed by Yang et 
al. (2010) for the YRB. Thus, this paper focuses on results and insights for water allocation in the YRB 
while Yang et al. focused on the modeling method. The following sections introduce the model used for 
the analysis, describe the scenarios analyzed, present the results, and conclude with a series of final 
remarks.  
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2.  MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR THE YELLOW RIVER BASIN 
Traditionally, to address issues of water resource allocation, the entire basin was modeled as a single 
system, with water use of individual water users (agents) as a decision variable in a consistent 
mathematical programming model that optimizes system-level objectives. However, in real-world 
situations, individual agents can make decisions that would maximize personal profits but not necessarily 
confer basin or system-wide benefits. Thus, the number of decision variables can quickly become too 
large, rendering the model unsolvable. The situation is even more complex if the utility function is 
nonlinear. In order to reduce computational difficulty while still reflecting real-world water allocation 
institutions, we apply a Multi-Agent System (MAS) developed by Yang et al. (2010) to analyze the water 
allocation problem of the YRB. 
The theory of MAS has emerged from computer science theories associated with distributed 
artificial intelligence (Sycara 1998). An agent is defined as an autonomous unit within a system that 
interacts with others and is characterized by behavioral rules. In a watershed MAS, agents can be defined 
as water users that utilize water for their own benefits (Yang et al., 2009). The water use decisions of the 
agent are affected by the behavior of its neighbors, and are limited by both physical conditions and 
management regulations. The MAS model depicts water management institutions more realistically than 
does a conventional centralized model, which assumes an omniscient decision maker controlling not only 
system-level decisions but also the decisions of individual water users or stakeholders. The definitions of 
agents are briefly described as follows.  
Zhao et al. (2009) used the border of provinces and the boundary of natural sub-basins or 
watersheds to decompose the entire YRB into a number of hydro-economic units, or agents (Figure 2.1a). 
For each of these units we estimated the values of local surface inflows, which consider local overland 
flow and evaporation. The amount of groundwater supply was also assessed and treated as a local 
reservoir in each unit. Local surface inflow, groundwater supply, and upstream inflows were treated as 
total available water for each unit. Water utilization was separated into agricultural and municipal and 
industrial (M&I) use. Hydropower stations were included as separate additional agents, as were minimum 
environmental flows at downstream stations. Water use data for each category of water use and the 
corresponding gross domestic product (GDP) were also summarized for each of the hydro-economic 
units. Based on these data, a total of 52 units were identified and defined as agents (Figure 2.1b). 
Figure 2.1a—Hydro-economic units, Yellow River Basin 
 
Source: Authors.  
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Figure 2.1b—Agent map of the Yellow River Basin- 52 general agents, 5 reservoir agents and 3 
ecosystem agents 
 
Source: Zhao et al. (2009). 
Agents are characterized by water availability, water use, and associated benefit functions. 
Benefit functions for M&I and agricultural water use were developed based on the relationship between 
GDP and water use by sector. Details are presented in Yang et al. (2010). 
More than 3,000 reservoirs are located in the YRB. Their total storage is approximately 70 km
3, 
which exceeds the total annual runoff of the river of 58 km
3 (Cai and Rosegrant 2004). It is impossible 
(and not necessary) to identify all the reservoirs as agents in this study, because most of them are small 
and their capacity is not sufficient to carry over water across the minimum time period of the model (that 
is, a month). Therefore, only the five key reservoirs were included as separate agents. They are, from 
upstream to downstream, Longyangxia, Liujiaxia, Wanjiazhai, Sanmenxia, and Xiaolangdi. The 
combined storage for these reservoirs is about 51 km
3. The selected reservoirs are all multipurpose for 
water supply, flood control, and hydropower generation. As a result, their operation rules are highly 
complex. Incorporating the real operation rules of each reservoir into the modeling is beyond the scope of 
this study. To simplify the model without misrepresenting this complex system, the reservoir agents are 
characterized by two behavior rules, 1) they follow their predetermined operation curve to regulate 
streamflow, and 2) they maximize hydropower generation.  
Three ecosystem agents are defined near the river mouth as reflecting important ecological and 
environmental concerns in the lower basin area. Ecological and environmental flow requirements have 
been assessed by local scientists (for example, Ni et al. 2002, Yang et al. 2009, Cui et al. 2009, and Liu et 
al. 2009). They considered different environmental functions of the streamflow and defined 
environmental flow requirements for high-flow (July to October) and low-flow (November to June) 
periods. The results of Ni et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2009) are used to set up the target flow for two 
ecosystem agents: Huayuankou and Gaocun. Water demands of a third ecosystem agent, Lijin, at the delta 
of the Yellow River, have been assessed by Cui et al. (2009) and Liu et al. (2009). Cui et al. (2009) 
separated a fish breeding period (April to June) from the reminder of the low-flow period. Liu et al. 
(2009) defined total ecological water requirements with consideration for wetland plants, freshwater fish 
communities, and the bayou ecosystem. We adapt the flow requirements of Cui et al. (2009) for this 
study. Flow targets for all ecosystem agents in different time periods are provided in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 
also provides a second, higher set of instream flow targets needed for sediment flushing. These were not 




Table 2.1—Target instream flow for ecosystem agents (EA) in different periods (without/with 
considering sediment flushing) (billion m
3/month) 
Agents 
Normal flow period 
(November–March) 




EA1 (Huayuankou)  0.341/0.605  0.341/0.605  0.455/5.111 
EA2 (Gaocun)  0.277/0.612  0.277/0.612  0.397/6.016 
EA3 (Lijin)  0.363/0.363  2.581/2.581  0.850/15.85 
Source: Collected from various references for this study. 
Note: EA = Ecosystem Agent. The subscript 1, 2, and 3 refer to the respective locations.  
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3.  SCENARIO DEFINITIONS 
Three different scenarios are used in this study to evaluate the consequences of different water 
management mechanisms for the YRB:  
1.  the de facto water allocation plan (baseline),  
2.  unmanaged water allocation (without basin-wide regulation prior to 1999), and  
3.  market-based water allocation 
This section describes these scenarios, as well as their implementation through the various agents 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1—Agent settings across scenarios 
  UWFR  Unmanaged  Water Trading 
General 
agents 
Water consumption is limited 
by physical constraints and 
water rights 
Water consumption is only 
limited by physical 
constraints 
Water consumption is 
limited by physical 
constraints, can surpass 
water rights through trade 
Reservoir 
agents 
Minimizing the difference 
between actual and target 
water release  
Maximizing the product of 




agents  Inactive  Inactive  Inactive, but using UWFR 
results as flow requirement 
Source: Authors. 
Note: UWFR stands for Unified Water Flow Regulation. 
Baseline Scenario (UWFR) 
During 1972–1998, Yellow River streamflow did not reach the river mouth several days of the year, 
causing serious socioeconomic and environmental problems in the downstream area, and raising concerns 
in the Chinese government and internationally. To address this problem, the Yellow River Conservancy 
Commission (YRCC), authorized by the State Council of China, implemented the Unified Water Flow 
Regulation (UWFR) in the YRB. The UWFR is based on a 1987 Agreement on water quotas across the 
riparian provinces in the basin (see Table 3.2). The Agreement allocates a total of 37 km
3 across the 
riparian provinces, including 2 km
3 to downstream urban-industrial centers outside the basin area, out of a 
total runoff of 58 km
3. The UWFR scenario ensures that flows reach all downstream ecosystem agents 
throughout the year. 




3)  Province 
Water withdrawal  
(billion m
3) 
Qinghai  1.41  Shaanxi  3.80 
Sichuan  0.04  Shanxi  4.31 
Gansu  3.04  Henan  5.54 
Ningxia  4.00  Shandong  7.00 
Inner Mongolia  5.86  Hebei/Tianjin  2.00 
Source: Zhao et al. 2009. 
Under the UWFR, YRCC issues water release targets for each reservoir every month, considering 
the current reservoir storage, future weather forecasts, and downstream water demand. This study  
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assumes that the objective for each reservoir is to match the suggested release issued by YRCC under the 
UWFR, based on actual monthly water releases in 2000, which have been used for calibration. However, 
it should be noted that YRB reservoir operations are highly complex due to the multiple functions of each 
of the reservoirs; as a result, reservoir managers may not exactly follow the instructions from YRCC. 
Scenario without Regulation 
The scenario without regulation assumes no management regulation. As a result, the agents are free to use 
all available water supplies to meet demands. The only constraint that will affect their decision is the 
physical limitation of water availability. An obvious result from this scenario is that upstream water users 
will take advantage of available water while downstream water users can only utilize whatever is left 
from upstream. In addition, the objectives of reservoir agents are no longer constrained by the prescribed 
release targets under the UWFR. Instead, reservoir agents try to maximize hydropower generation. The 
main purpose of the UWFR is to avoid flow cutoffs in the downstream channel. When no regulation is 
enforced, it is expected that flows will be cut off at downstream reaches under this scenario. 
Water Trading Scenario  
The baseline scenario (UWFR) assumes that all agents will follow the water quota agreement. In other 
words, actual water consumption (xi) for each agent will be less or equal to the water rights (wi) assigned 
under the UWFR. In the water trading scenario, on the other hand, water depletion can be higher or lower 
based on the volume of water traded. In particular, agricultural agents can trade water across the entire 
system. Municipal and industrial (M&I) agents are not active traders, because their demands are met 
following priority allocation. Under this market-based setting, water trading is allowed between upstream 
and downstream agents. The general convergence criterion is that total water use must equal total water 
rights. The initial water entitlements are the same as those under the UWFR scenario. In a true water 
market, sales and purchases would need to match, but under this scenario, a quasi-market is assumed, 
where the government steps in to purchase excess water. 
The market-based allocation mechanism is formulated to solve the water allocation problem. 
Without any centralized controls, an equilibrium condition can only be achieved by setting a convergence 
criterion. We do this through the price bargaining process, where local water prices are adjusted to ensure 
that the system-wide total water consumption equals total water rights. The equilibrium is reached when 
no agent in the system buys or sells additional water, after reaching the maximum marginal benefit 
through the price bargaining process. 
In this scenario, allowing water transactions for the entire system means reservoir operation 
would become even more complex than for the previous two scenarios. Because the purpose of this 
scenario is to compare the impact of water use agents’ decisions with the baseline, we render reservoir 
agents inactive for simplification. Using the monthly storage from the results of UWFR as targets, the 
reservoir agents under this scenario are set to match these target storages. If upstream inflow to the 
reservoir increases, reservoir releases increase proportionally, and vice versa. This setting allows water to 
move from upstream to downstream areas and water transaction to occur freely without reservoir 
economic constraints.  
Ecosystem agents are also rendered inactive under the UWFR scenario. However, because no 
water benefit functions have been established for ecosystem agents, ecosystem benefits would be 
sacrificed under the water trading scenario. To ensure continued ecosystem flows, a constraint is placed 
on the agents located just upstream of the three ecosystem agents to ensure that their outflows match 
UWFR requirements. This is implemented by introducing a constraint to the local water price bargaining 
process, when UWFR requirements at the ecosystem nodes are not met. Because achieving the required 
downstream ecosystem flows will affect all upstream agents, the responsibility to maintain a certain level 
of stream flow for ecosystems is shared by all upstream agents.  
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4.  RESULTS 
Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) Baseline Scenario 
The Multi-Agent System (MAS) model is calibrated to the UWFR in 2000. In particular, flows are 
calibrated to: 1) the annual water consumption of all water use agents, 2) the monthly reservoir storage of 
all reservoir agents, and 3) the monthly streamflow at key gauges along the main channel and major 
tributaries. Results for water consumption and reservoir storage are provided in Figure 4.1.  




Source: This study. 
Figure 4.1a plots the observed agent water consumption versus the modeled results. The observed 
annual total water consumption is 35.7 billion m
3 and the modeled result is 34.5 billion m
3, with a root 
mean square error (RMSE) of 0.106 billion m
3, or less than 1 percent of the total annual water 
consumption. Although there is a slight underestimation at the system level, the modeled water 
consumption patterns at the agent level matches well with observed values. Figure 4.1b presents a 
comparison for reservoir storage with similar calibration results for all the modeled reservoirs. The 
RMSEs for the five reservoirs—Longyangxia, Liujiaxia, Wanjiazhai, Sanmenxia, and Xiaolangdi—are 
0.169, 0.175, 0.055, 0.033, and 0.448 billion m
3, respectively. 
To evaluate calibration to 2000 streamflows, Figure 4.2 presents results for three flow-gauging 
stations located upstream, midstream, and downstream, respectively, as can be seen in Figure 4.2a. Figure 
4.2b presents the result for Tangnaigai station. Because water consumption upstream is relatively low 
compared to streamflows, the streamflow result shows a perfect match with observed data. Figure 4.2c 
presents results for the midstream Toudaoguai station. Here, the modeled result shows a slight 




4.2d presents the results for Lijin station, which is the most downstream flow-gauging station in the basin. 
Underestimation exists in the non-flood period (November to March), but the overall pattern is still 
captured well by the model. The RMSEs for these three stations—Tangnaigai, Toudaoguai, and Lijin—
are 0.003, 0.282, and 0.160 billion m
3, respectively. 
Figure 4.2—The calibration result of streamflow (a) gauge station locations; (b) upstream result—
Tangnaigai station; (c) midstream result—Toudaoguai Station; (d) downstream result—Lijin 
Station  
 
Source: This study. 
Although the modeled results do not fully match the observations, the monthly pattern at the 
system level and the spatial patterns at the agent level all show a similar tendency, and RMSE values are 
at an acceptable range. Based on these calibration results, it is assumed that the MAS model can represent 
the current water usage condition reasonably well, and this calibrated model is used for additional 
scenario analyses.  
Scenario without Regulation  
The scenario without regulation mimics the situation before the UWFR was implemented, where agents 
can use as much water as they want up to the physical water availability limit. All other parameters and 












(c)  (d)  
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Figure 4.3—System-wide comparison between the UWFR scenario (baseline) and the unmanaged 
water scenario (a) monthly water consumption (billion m3); (b) monthly GDP (billion RMB; 1 
RMB = approximately US$0.146)  
 
Source: This study. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.3a, under the unmanaged scenario, water consumption increases 
during the high-flow period (July to October) and decreases in the low-flow period. This is due to the 
larger water flows that can be depleted under first-come-first-serve (unregulated) flow allocation, whereas 
under the low-flow period, UWFR consumption levels are higher due to the larger reservoir storage and 
thus flow regulation capability under UWFR. One exception is water consumption in the low-flow month 
of January, which is larger under the unregulated flow scenario. This is because the reservoir storage for 
the first month is sufficiently large to sustain a higher water consumption level. However, less water is 
released from the reservoirs during February to June, which results in a decline in water availability for 
downstream water use agents. Basin gross domestic product (GDP) reflects the monthly patterns of water 
consumption (Figure 4.3b). The decline in water consumption of about 2 billion m
3 per month during 
February to June results in an average basin GDP decline of 40 billion RMB per month. On the other 
hand, the water consumption increases from July to October result in a slight increase in GDP. Annual 
water consumption under the scenario without regulation is 38.3 billion m
3, 11 percent higher than the 
34.5 billion m
3 under the UWFR scenario. The basin-wide GDP is 1123.26 billion RMB under the 
scenario without regulation, 10 percent less than the 1246.68 billion RMB under the UWFR scenario. 
The downstream ecosystem is adversely affected under this scenario, as is shown in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4a indicates the location of the three ecosystem agents. Figure 4.4b presents the result for 
ecosystem agent 1 (EA1), identified as Huayuankou. Flow cutoff events occur from February to June 
under the unmanaged scenario. Monthly flows average 0.389 billion m
3 for the scenario without 
regulation and 0.972 billion m
3 for the UWFR scenario. The flow difference and cutoff periods are even 
larger for ecosystem agents closer to the river mouth (Figures 4.4c and 4.4d).  
(a)  (b)  
10 
Figure 4.4—Ecosystem agent comparison between the UWFR scenario (baseline) and the 
unmanaged scenario (a) ecosystem agents’ locations; (b) result for ecosystem agent 1—




Source: This study. 
Figure 4.4c shows the result at Gaocun station, where ecosystem agent 2 (EA2) is located. The 
flow cutoff period is the same as for Huayuankou, and average monthly streamflow declines from 1.016 
billion m
3 under the baseline scenario to 0.350 billion m
3 under the unmanaged flow scenario. Flow 
impacts are strongest for the most downstream ecosystem agent 3 (EA3) in the delta area (Figure 4.4d), 
where cutoff periods start in February and continue through December. Average flows drop from 0.358 
billion m
3 to 0.051 billion m
3. These results reflect the period from 1972 to 1998, when the UWFR was 
not yet enforced.  
These results show the benefit of the UWFR for downstream ecosystem flows. The annual 
average streamflow for ecosystem agents increases three to six times, and no flow cutoff events occur. 
This result matches the real-world situation—no flow cutoff events have been recorded since 1999, when 
the UWFR started to be enforced. Moreover, basin water consumption under the UWFR scenario is lower 
and GDP higher compared to the unmanaged scenario. Although some upstream agents experience 
declines in GDP—upstream GDP declines by about 2.5 billion RMB annually—basin-wide GDP is 
higher.  
Water Trading Scenario  
The water trading scenario starts from an initial water price of 27 RMB/m
3, a value estimated based on a 
series of model simulations. If the local water price is above this value, all agents would only use water 
for municipal and industrial (M&I) use and sell the rest of their water entitlement. This implies that the 
maximum marginal benefit of agricultural water use over the entire basin is 27 RMB/m
3. Starting from 
this initial water price, the model ends with equilibrium water prices for each agent and month. Results 







(c)  (d) 
(a)  
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Figure 4.5—Equilibrium water prices for different agents in different months (a) January; (b) 
June; (c) August; (d) September 
  
Source: This study. 
Generally, water prices are higher in tributaries than in the mainstream because much less water 
is available and can be transferred. January is an example of a month with relatively uniform water prices 
for agents along the mainstream and the major tributaries. Only a few agents located at smaller tributaries 
in the downstream area show higher water prices (Figure 4.5a). Moreover, because January is usually the 
month with the lowest flow, the average water price for the entire system is relatively high compared to 
other months. In general, water prices are lower in high-flow months. However, spatial heterogeneity in 
water prices is a reality even in the high-flow season. Moreover, water prices in tributaries, particularly 
the source areas of tributaries, are higher than those in other places. This is because water transactions 
from the mainstream toward tributaries or from downstream toward upstream areas are physically 
impossible without engineering works. The marginal benefit of water in those areas will therefore be 
higher under the water trading scenario. The results for basin-wide water consumption and GDP are 
presented in Figure 4.6, as a comparison to the baseline scenario. 
The monthly water consumption under the water trading scenario is slightly lower than that under 
the UWFR scenario (Figure 4.6a). Total water consumption is 33.80 billion m
3 compared to 34.52 billion 
m
3 under UWFR, while total GDP is higher under the trading scenario (Figure 4.6b). Monthly basin GDP 
increases particularly during the flood period (July to October). This is because more water is available 
for trading in this period. The basin-wide GDP under the trading scenario is 1270.1 billion RMB, 
compared to 1246.7 billion RMB under the UWFR. The GDP for individual trading agents is either 
greater or equal to that under the UWFR because water trading occurs only when both water seller and 
water buyer benefit from the transaction.  
 
 
   
 
(c)  (d) 
(a)  (b)  
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Figure 4.6—Basin-wide comparisons between the UWFR scenario (baseline) and the water trading 
scenario (a) monthly water consumption (billion m
3); (b) monthly GDP (billion RMB) 
 
Source: This study. 
Table 4.1 presents a summary of the difference in water consumption and GDP under the water 
trading scenario and the baseline (UWFR) for upstream and midstream/downstream agents. It should be 
noted that the consumption values presented are not equivalent to the volume of water traded. As 
expected, the upstream agents (Agent 1 to Agent 22) use less water under the water trading scenario 
compared to the UWFR scenario (about 3.27 billion m
3 annually), while the midstream and downstream 
agents (Agent 23 to Agent 52) use more (2.55 billion m
3 annually). This confirms that upstream agents 
tend to sell water to gain revenue and downstream agents tend to buy water for greater water use benefit. 
The GDP increase is 5.64 billion RMB for upstream agents and 17.8 billion RMB for midstream and 
downstream agents, with a total annual GDP increase of 23.45 billion RMB. Most of the additional 
economic benefit, 88 percent, is obtained during the high-flow period (77 percent for upstream agents and 
92 percent for midstream/downstream agents). Thus, interestingly, a small reallocation of water in the 
high-flow season does have a significant value to water-using agents, particularly in the mid- and 
downstream reaches.  
Table 4.1—Differences in water consumption and GDP for upstream and midstream/downstream 
agents in water trading and UWFR scenario (billion m3 and RMB) 
Month 









1  -0.058  -0.022  0.299  0.162 
2  0.001  -0.011  0.088  0.100 
3  -0.047  0.021  0.102  0.213 
4  -0.086  -0.004  0.089  0.040 
5  -0.056  0.070  0.306  0.191 
6  -0.100  0.044  0.150  0.073 
7  -0.568  0.380  0.904  3.193 
8  -0.420  0.262  0.849  1.988 
9  -1.137  1.082  1.563  5.924 
10  -0.721  0.678  1.076  5.308 
11  -0.030  0.005  0.149  0.150 
12  -0.054  0.046  0.072  0.461 
Sum  -3.276  2.551  5.648  17.805 
Source: This study. 
   
 
(a)  (b)  
13 
Table 4.2 presents the actual volume of water bought and sold by upstream and 
midstream/downstream agents and for the entire basin over 12 months. Again, midstream and 
downstream agents buy more water, whereas upstream agents sell more water. Moreover, for all months, 
the quantity of water sold exceeds the quantity of water purchased. The additional water is used to fulfill 
the ecosystem flow requirements. The government has to buy this amount of water to maintain 
downstream ecosystem flows given the established ecological flow targets. The total annual value of 
water transactions, at 2.95 million RMB, is actually quite low compared to the total additional basin-wide 
GDP increase of 23.45 billion RMB. Thus, water trading is efficient from an economic point of view.  





















Difference  Transaction 
value 
1  0.0004  0.0001  0.0674  0.0405  0.0005  0.11  0.11  0.56 
2  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.05  0.02 
3  0.01  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.06 
4  0.01  0.02  0.14  0.05  0.03  0.19  0.16  0.06 
5  0.09  0.09  0.47  0.04  0.18  0.51  0.32  0.06 
6  0.04  0.07  0.19  0.06  0.12  0.24  0.13  0.02 
7  0.08  0.79  0.93  0.66  0.88  1.58  0.71  0.81 
8  0.12  0.44  0.99  0.42  0.56  1.41  0.86  0.54 
9  0.09  1.41  1.54  0.44  1.50  1.98  0.48  0.42 
10  0.06  0.69  0.87  0.09  0.75  0.96  0.21  0.28 
11  0.01  0.04  0.15  0.07  0.06  0.21  0.15  0.07 
12  0.0005  0.0908  0.0564  0.0610  0.0914  0.12  0.03  0.05 
Sum  0.53  3.72  5.50  2.01  4.25  7.51  3.26  2.95 
Source: This study. 
The results of the water trading scenario demonstrate that basin-wide water-related GDP can 
increase significantly under water trading despite strict flow control measures for the downstream 
ecosystem as enforced by the government since 1999.  
Figure 4.7 presents total water consumption results across the basin provinces for the UWFR 
baseline as well as for the unmanaged and water trading scenarios. Compared to the UWFR, water 
depletion increases significantly upstream under the unmanaged scenario, which supports maximization 
of withdrawals upstream. Under UWFR, on the other hand, more water flows downstream for higher-
value agricultural withdrawals, particularly in Shandong Province, and to support downstream ecosystem 
flow requirements. The water trading scenario similarly follows prescribed withdrawals downstream to 
support the ecosystem agents, but also reallocates water from Inner Mongolia and Ningxia to Shanxi, 
Shaanxi, and Gansu Provinces.   
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Figure 4.7—Water consumption in the YRB under alternative allocation scenarios (BCM) 
 
Source: This study. 
The Impact of Alternative Ecosystem Flow Requirements 
The UWFR was implemented chiefly to restore downstream flows in the YRB to preserve the ecosystem 
in the delta area. However, several studies suggest flow level requirements that exceed the achievements 
of the UWFR. In the following, we assess the impact of ecosystem flow requirements suggested in the 
literature on flow availability and the potential for water trading under these larger downstream ecosystem 
flow requirements. Instead of the UWFR downstream flows, the values of the instream flow requirements 
presented in Table 2.1 are used for the agents controlling ecosystem flows downstream. Under this 
scenario, upstream bargaining between agents cannot result in streamflows below those listed in Table 2.1 
(using the values that do not consider sediment flushing). The difference between UWFR values and 
ecosystem flow target values are shown in Figure 4.8. EA1 and EA2 have lower ecosystem flow needs 
compared to EA3, where the suggested instream flows for EA3 in April, May, and June are significantly 
higher than for other months to sustain the fish breeding period in the bayou area. The initial water prices 
and the setting of reservoir agents remain the same as discussed above.  
Table 4.3 presents the results for basin-wide water trading, and shows that under the higher 
ecosystem flow requirements water purchases decline to zero for the months of January, April, and June, 
which means that no one is buying water in the system and that agents consume water equivalent to M&I 
needs, which reflects the minimum water use of an agent. At the same time, agents sell significant 
amounts of water to maintain ecosystem flows. Despite these sales, instream flow requirements cannot be 
fully met in the months of January, where a total of 0.36 billion m
3 is needed, and April and June, where 
downstream flow needs amount to 2.58 billion m
3 of water. Thus, it is physically impossible to satisfy 
both human and ecosystem requirements in those months unless additional measures are undertaken, such 
as reservoir reoperations or new infrastructure development. The total transaction value or costs for the 
government (third column in Table 4.3) for those three months are computed using the initial water price 
(27 RMB/m
3). It should be noted that the 27 RMB in these three months are used for calculation purposes 
only. 
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Figure 4.8—Ecosystem agent streamflow comparison across the UWFR, the water trading, and the 
water trading with ecosystem flow scenarios (a) ecosystem agents’ locations; (b) streamflows for 





   
Source: This study. 
Table 4.3—System-wide water trading and transaction value using suggested ecosystem flow 
requirements 
Month  Total water purchase  Total water sales  Difference  Transaction value 
  (billion m
3)  (billion RMB) 
1  0.00  0.29  0.29  7.88 
2  0.02  0.21  0.20  0.49 
3  0.01  0.35  0.35  1.12 
4  0.00  1.82  1.82  49.18 
5  0.03  2.73  2.70  5.39 
6  0.00  2.39  2.39  64.46 
7  0.92  1.58  0.65  0.35 
8  0.56  1.81  1.25  0.75 
9  1.20  2.37  1.17  2.09 
10  0.80  1.10  0.30  0.33 
11  0.13  0.13  0.00  0.00 
12  0.09  0.10  0.01  0.01 
Sum  3.76  14.89  11.13  132.05 
Source: This study. 









Annual average water prices for the two different ecosystem flow requirement settings are 
presented in Figure 4.9. Because January, April, and June used the initial water price due to the physical 
limitation, these three months are excluded from the annual average water price computation. When 
UWFR flows are used as instream flow targets, the average water price on the mainstream is 1.16 
RMB/m
3. If the ecosystems flow requirements follow the published literature, then the average water 
price on the mainstream increases to 1.62 RMB/m
3. The spatial patterns of Figure 4.9a and 4.9b are very 
similar, but water prices are about 30 percent higher, on average.  
Figure 4.9—Annual average water prices under different ecosystem flow requirements (a) using 
UWFR results as target flows; (b) using suggested values from previous environmental flow studies 
presented in Table 2.1 
  







5.  CONCLUSIONS  
This paper addresses basin-wide water allocation considering both human and natural water demands 
using a Multi-Agent System (MAS) model. Decision making for different types of water users with 
different objective functions located in a river basin context is complex due to spatial heterogeneity, 
temporal variability, and historical and political considerations. The MAS modeling framework can 
define each water user and reservoir as active, and ecological zones as reactive agents, and represent the 
problem mathematically. A penalty-based, decentralized optimization algorithm is applied to solve the 
problem. 
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China, a basin with a long history of basin-wide water 
resources management practices, is used as a case study to demonstrate the real-world functionality of the 
MAS model, which is formulated and run for several scenarios. The Unified Water Flow Regulation 
(UWFR) conditions observed in 2000 are used as the baseline for both model calibration and scenario 
comparison. The calibration process shows a reasonable match between MAS-modeled water 
consumption and streamflows and the observed values.  
Two additional scenarios, one representing water allocation and use prior to the UWFR scenario, 
the scenario without regulation, and one scenario allowing for water rights trading, are evaluated 
regarding the impact of different management mechanisms. The scenario without regulation results in 
higher basin water consumption but lower basin gross domestic product (GDP) compared to the baseline 
scenario, and flow cutoffs occur in the downstream area of the basin. The water trading scenario, solved 
by a penalty-based, decentralized optimization algorithm, results in both lower water consumption and 
higher basin GDP compared to the UWFR scenario. The water trading scenario can improve agents’ net 
benefits as well as overall basin water use efficiency. In this scenario, water prices are determined locally 
on a monthly basis. Results show significant variation across agents and months. Moreover, we can also 
calculate the total value of water transactions and compare it to total GDP increase to assess whether 
basin welfare increases under water trading. The value of water trading would be much higher if 
municipal and industrial (M&I) use did not receive first priority and thus would become an active water 
trading sector.  
An extended analysis shows the consequences of different ecosystem flow requirements on 
equilibrium water prices and water trading outcomes. The results indicate that ecosystem flow 
requirements cannot be fully met for some months in 2000 if all M&I demands in the basin are also to be 
fulfilled; furthermore, irrigation would have to be significantly curtailed. Thus, the competition between 
M&I and ecosystem flow demands is expected to increase, and irrigated agriculture will likely be the 
sector losing water as a result. One way to address this issue would be for reservoir agents to include 
ecological flow requirements in their operation rules for storage and release.  
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APPENDIX: THE ALGORITHM TO SOLVE THE MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODEL 
A modified, penalty-based, decentralized method (İnalhan et al. 2002, Yang et al. 2009) is applied in this 
study to solve the formulated Multi-Agent System (MAS) mathematical problem. This algorithm allows 
each agent to have its own decision context that captures both local benefits and the interconnected 
constraints associated with these benefits. The method achieves optimization among agents under a 
bargaining scheme, in which the i
th agent optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration 
and sends the solution back to all other agents with which it interacts. The method uses a two-step 
approach, first finding a solution based on the choices of all individual agents, allowing the violation of 
some constraints defined with the optimization models for individual agents, and then trying to reduce the 
constraint violation at the basin level until all constraints are successfully met. 
We apply the algorithm to the Yellow River Basin (YRB). We also introduce a management 
mechanism that assumes the presence of water rights and water rights trading. The mathematical 
expression for each water user (agent) is: 
  { } ) ( ) ( max ) , ( max i i i i i i i i i w x p x f w p x F − − =
,  (A1) 
where xi is the water consumption from agent i, fi(xi) is the benefit corresponding to xi consumption, pi > 0 
is the local water price applied to agent i, and wi is water rights or water permit for agent i. Under this 
setting, xi - wi ≠ 0 can be viewed as the amount of water trading for agent i. When xi < wi, “- pi (xi - wi)” is 
positive, which means agent i uses less water than it is entitled to. Therefore, “- pi (xi - wi),” is the benefit 
of water selling and works as an incentive to the agent. When xi > wi, “- pi (xi - wi)” is negative and can be 
interpolated as the cost of water buying for agent i. Applying the first-order condition to equation A1, we 
can have: 
 





i p x f
x
F
.  (A2) 
It is assumed that each agent will adjust its pi to satisfy equation A2, which means that the 
marginal benefit equals the local water price and that the ideal converge criteria at the system level match 
when the condition in equation A2 is satisfied for all agents. 
The introduction of a water trading mechanism to the MAS formulation allows for water uses of 
different agents to bypass the original water permit limits by buying additional use rights (or selling use 
rights if the predetermined water price is too high to warrant productive activities). The following criteria 
are set up to ensure that water prices converge at a reasonable level: 1) total water consumption equals 
less than or the same as total water permits; 2) whenever the outflow from agent i reaches zero, water 
trading with agent i will stop, which means additional trade is physically impossible even if desired by 
agents; 3) agents cannot buy water from downstream agents (negative outflow); 4) only water for 
agricultural uses can be traded; municipal and industrial (M&I) water use is treated as the basic water use 
rights for all agents and needs to be met before any irrigation demand can be met; and 5) to avoid flow 
cutoff downstream, minimum flow requirements are set for ecosystem agents equivalent to what has been 
achieved under the Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) in force since 1999. 
Figure A.1 presents the concept to determine converging local prices. Whenever the outflow from 
an agent i become negative, the water price will stop decreasing for agent i, which means additional trade 
is physically impossible, even if it is desired by agents. If we put this constraint (Ii ≥ Ii**, Ii** = 0 in our 
setting) on Figure A.1, it will act as an additional constraint for water consumption, because the outflow 
from agent i is the result of the water balance equation, and if a constraint is enforced on outflow it will 
also affect water consumption. Due to this constraint, the water price cannot decrease to the level 
determined by the market (pi*), but is constrained at a new equilibrium price (pi**). Meanwhile, the water 
price decease for all agents above agent i will also stop at this point. This criterion means that any  
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physically possible water transaction (from upstream to downstream) is allowed, but it is unfeasible for an 
upstream agent to buy water from a downstream (negative outflow) agent. The water price will converge 
in this situation. These converged water prices are the equilibrium prices for the maximum amount of 
water transactions under the physical constraint. Figure A.1 also shows that the new equilibrium prices 
(pi**) when the physical constraint is taken into account will be higher than the water price (pi*) solely 
based on the market incentive. The marginal benefit of water is higher in this situation. When the water 
price is maintained at a level higher than pi*, the total water sold can be larger than the total water bought, 
which implies that the additional water will be left in the stream to fulfill the environmental flow 
requirements. 
Figure A.1—The convergence of local water price and the consequent agents’ water consumption 
with local streamflow (physical) constraints 
 
Sources: This study. 
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